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and who did not. Original survey data shows that the exogenous element of conscription (by 
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experienced. Meanwhile, abduction and violence do not appear to affect multiple non-political 
types of community participation. I show that these patterns are not easily explained by 
models of participation based on simple rational preferences, social preferences, mobilization 
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What is the political legacy of violent conflict? This paper presents evidence for a link between war, 
violence and increased individual political participation and leadership among former combatants and 
victims of violence, and uses this link to understand the deeper determinants of individual political 
behavior. The setting is northern Uganda, where rebel recruitment methods generated quasi-
experimental variation in who became a rebel conscript and who did not. Original survey data shows 
that the exogenous element of conscription (by abduction) leads to significantly greater political 
participation later in life. The principal determinant of this increased political participation, moreover, 
appears to be war violence experienced. Meanwhile, abduction and violence do not appear to affect 
multiple non-political types of community participation. I show that these patterns are not easily 
explained by models of participation based on simple rational preferences, social preferences, 
mobilization by elites, or information availability. Only ‘expressive’ theories of participation appear 
consistent with the patterns observed, whereby exposure to violence augments the value a person 
places on the act of political expression itself. The implications for general theories of political 
participation are discussed. 
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1.  Introduction 
What is the political legacy of a violent civil war? Can perpetrators and victims of violence become 
productive citizens once the fighting stops? Policy-makers appear pessimistic. A World Bank document 
suggests that the impacts of civil war are often so adverse that they “cannot reasonably be viewed as so-
cial progress” (2003: 32). There is particular concern (and scattered evidence) that former combatants are 
especially likely to lead lives of crime, violence, and exclusion. The French foreign minister, addressing a 
recent UN conference, spoke of young ex-soldiers as “a time bomb that threatens stability and growth” 
(BBC, 2007). A New York Times (2006) editorial lamented that such youth return as “damaged, unedu-
cated pariahs”. Reintegration experts worry that former combatants face a life of crime and banditry 
(Spear, 2006) and that these youth remain alienated and “at war” in their own minds (Richards et al., 
2003). If these commentators are correct, then the rebuilding of civil society and democracy will be all 
the more challenging and unlikely in post-conflict states, and may even contribute to the well-known 
‘conflict trap’ (Collier, 2003; 2007). 
Not all of the evidence is so gloomy. A small literature ties victimization by war violence to greater 
political and collective action. Wood (2003) argues that government violence in El Salvador prompted 
its’ victims to support and even join opposition forces out of moral outrage. Bellows and Miguel (2007) 
find that war-related displacement or deaths in the family lead to greater political participation and 
awareness in Sierra Leonean households. Likewise, psychologists find that victims of violence are in gen-
eral resilient, and that exposure has even led to political activism among groups such as Jewish Holocaust 
survivors (Carmil and Breznitz, 1991) and Palestinian victims of bombardment (Punamaki et al., 1997). 
Toure (2002) argues that the civil war in Liberia saw the birth of a robust indigenous civil society and 
human rights organizations. Little of this evidence, however, demonstrates a clear causal link from vio-
lence to political engagement, and little of it deals with the perpetrators of violence.3 
This paper employs new data and an unfortunate natural experiment in Uganda to show that combat 
experiences and exposure to war violence lead to greater political participation and engagement among 
young men formerly in an armed group. This is potentially good news for policy makers in civil war-torn 
nations. For social scientists, however, it presents a puzzle: why should violence influence political par-
                                                   
3 There are some exceptions. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) document the determinants of demobilization and reintegra-
tion in Sierra Leone, and note that 62 percent of their survey respondents reported attitudes supportive of the government and 
democracy.    2
ticipation? The answer can expand our understanding of the determinants of individual political behavior 
more generally, and test competing theories of participation. 
Uganda provides a natural, albeit tragic, testing ground for theories about the individual impacts of 
war. A low-scale guerrilla war has plagued the north of the country for nearly twenty years. This paper 
will show that patterns of rebel recruitment appear to have generated nearly exogenous variation in par-
ticipation in warfare and violence. Over the past two decades tens of thousands of adolescent and young 
adult males have been forcibly recruited, or abducted, by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Abduction 
was large-scale and, according to rebel leaders themselves, indiscriminate. Survey data support this un-
usual claim, and suggest that rebel conscription is exogenous conditional on year and location of birth.  
If abduction is indeed conditionally exogenous, causal estimates of its impact on later-life outcomes 
such as social and political participation can be identified. The results in this paper suggest that forced 
recruitment leads to greater political participation—a 22 percent increase in the likelihood of voting, a 
more than doubling of the likelihood of being a community leader or holding a political job, and a 73 
percent increase in the likelihood of being a member of a peace-promoting organization. Abduction, 
however, does not seem to systematically affect non-political forms of social participation, such as com-
munity group membership or public goods management, suggesting that the impact of conscription is 
uniquely political. 
Of course, conscription simply represents a package of war experiences—violence experienced, vio-
lence perpetrated, military training, indoctrination, time away from school and work—and it is these ex-
periences that probably account for any long term impacts we observe. Exploring the effect of such (po-
tentially endogenous) experiences among the abducted, this paper shows that violence, in particular vio-
lence received, can account for the bulk of the impact of abduction on participation. No other war ex-
periences are so significantly and consistently associated with both participation and abduction. 
Why should we expect abduction and violence to have any impact on an individual’s political expres-
sion at all? Almost none of the dominant theories of political participation appear consistent with the 
patterns we observe. First, there is little evidence that abduction or violence reduces the shoe leather 
costs of participation, making simple rationalist explanations unattractive. Second, there is no relation-
ship between abduction, violence, and non-political forms of participation and volunteering, suggesting 
that the channel of impact is not the augmentation of “social” preferences by violence.    3
Third, there is no indication that abductees are more likely to be targeted for mobilization by political 
elites. One reason is that there is little evidence of such activities on the ground, especially since compet-
ing political organizations in Uganda have little presence in the internal displacement camps where most 
of the population resides. More importantly, political participation is associated with the number of acts 
of violence experienced, a trait which is difficult for others to observe. If formerly abducted youth are 
being mobilized by elites, we would expect mobilization to be associated with more easily observed traits 
(such as abduction itself, or abduction length) rather than past experiences of violence. 
The patterns we observe are consistent, however, with “expressive” theories of participation, whereby 
voters and leaders are motivated to participate because violence augments the inherent value placed on 
political expression. The expressive interpretation should be accepted with caution, if only because it 
runs the risk of being axiomatic, and because it is difficult to demonstrate directly or disprove. Indeed, 
the case for expressive preferences presented in this paper is based primarily on the elimination of alter-
native explanations. As we will see, however, the expressive interpretation has intuitive appeal, is consis-
tent with the evidence, and is supported by growing a body of evidence in politics and psychology.  
The findings are relevant to at least two important literatures in political science and economic devel-
opment. First, the evidence contributes to our understanding of the general determinants of political par-
ticipation and collective action, providing some support to proponents of expressive behavior. The em-
pirical literature offers too few examples of exogenous variation in the determinants of political behavior, 
especially outside of the OECD. Understanding the impact of violence on micro-politics is particularly 
important in the developing world, as a third of developing countries (and two thirds of African ones) 
have experienced a societal conflict since the end of the Cold War (Marshall and Gurr, 2005). 
The findings also complement a macro-level literature linking war and political and institutional 
change. Wantchekon (2004) argues that nearly forty percent of all civil wars that took place from 1945 to 
1993 resulted in an improvement in the level of democracy, generally when warlords saw democratiza-
tion in their interests. Tilly (1992) argued that European wars of conquest led to the creation of central-
ized states when rulers in need of taxes and recruits built bureaucracies and bargained with subject popu-
lations. Conversely, in Africa, Herbst (2000) has suggested that state weakness is a product of too little 
warfare. This macro-level literature tends to explain the link from war to state-building or democracy as a 
result of interactions between group actors (such as states, elites, warlords, and subject populations). The   4
results in this paper suggest that war could also push a population towards more participatory politics 
and collective action at the micro-level—an exciting possibility for further research. 
2.  Violence and political participation in theory 
Social science has yet to produce a standard and empirically-supported theory of political participa-
tion. One of the most vexing issues is exemplified by the “paradox of voting”: in large elections, the 
chance that a single vote will change the outcome is so unlikely that the expected private benefit to vot-
ing is zero, and so even a small cost of voting should deter a rational individual from participating (Riker 
and Ordeshook, 1968; Downs, 1957). Yet voters do turn out in large numbers, confounding rationalists.4  
Three main adjustments to the rational model have been offered to overcome the paradox. One set 
of theories suggest that voters have social preferences and consider the benefit of their vote to others in 
their rational calculus.5 A second set propose that a consumption benefit is received from the act of vot-
ing itself, and are known as expressive theories for the emphasis they place on the inherent value of ex-
pressing one’s preferences.6 Scattered evidence, largely from the US, suggests several patterns consistent 
with such expressive voting behavior.7  
A third set of theories argue that political leaders are able to mobilize voters by applying social pres-
sure, attention, or material goods from political leaders (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Uhlaner, 1989). 
Experimental and non-experimental evidence suggests that personal requests and shaming are effective 
in turning out U.S. voters (Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber, 2004; Verba et al., 2000). In the 
context of an African state dominated by a single powerful party, political actors may be able to offer 
credible promises of patronage, political appointments, or other selective incentives to encourage people 
to turn out to vote, or to become a community leader.  
                                                   
4 Reviews of this literature include Feddersen (2004), Dhillon and Peralta (2002), and Aldrich (1993). 
5 e.g. Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007), Fowler (2006), Feddersen and Sandroni (2002), and Harsanyi (1992, 1977). 
6 For instance when individuals value the preservation of democracy (Downs, 1957), feel a civic duty to vote (Blais, 2000; Riker 
and Ordeshook, 1968), or receive psychological gains from voting with one’s preferences or ideological affiliation (Schuessler, 
2000; Brennan and Buchanan, 1984; Fiorina, 1976) 
7 Surveys of U.S. voters suggest several regularities: that the propensity to vote is associated with expressive acts such making a 
donation to the election commission; that the likelihood of voting is greater among ideologues than moderates; that pre-
election feelings about candidates influence vote choice; and that individuals vote to show disapproval of an disfavored candi-
date (Greene and Nelson, 2002; Copeland and Laband, 2002; Kan and Yang, 2001). Several mock voting exercises also suggest 
that altruistic voting is more likely when the chance of influencing the vote is small (Fischer, 1996; Carter and Guerrette, 1992).   5
Finally, a fourth set of information-based explanations propose that better educated and informed voters 
are more likely to participate, although the theoretical rationale is not clear.8 Rather, the argument is 
based on the well-established correlation between voting and education in the U.S. (e.g. Verba et al., 
2000) and the causal impact of news media exposure on U.S. voter turnout (George and Waldfogel, 
forthcoming; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2006; Gentzkow, 2006). 
A smaller literature has sought to explain participation in acts such as protest, community meetings, 
and rebellion.9 Analogous to the paradox of voting, the challenge faced in explaining such active partici-
pation is in most cases a problem of collective action—participation is individually costly, while many of 
the benefits are shared regardless of participation (Olson, 1965). To explain such participation, scholars 
typically look for the provision of selective benefits of a material or social nature.10  
Selective incentives are not always apparent, however, and in these cases expressive motives—
ideology, grievances, and moral outrage—are convincingly proposed as an alternative solution to the col-
lective action problem. For instance, expressive values are commonly cited by activists (e.g. Verba et al., 
2000) and ideology is frequently observed to be associated with membership in political associations 
(Leighley, 1995).11 In the context of violent rebellion, Gurr (1971), Scott (1976), and Wood (2003) argue 
that grievances and moral outrage are the primary motivators of participation. For instance, in her land-
mark study of insurgent collective action in El Salvador, Elisabeth Wood (2003) dissects the motivations 
of civilians that aided rebels (or became rebels themselves) and finds rational actor, class-based, and oth-
er conventional theories of participation are wholly unsupported. Rather, in her analysis, civilians were 
prompted to life-threatening collective action out of a sense of moral outrage and changing conceptions 
of justice in the wake of government violence against them and their family members and communities. 
There are several reasons to be cautious about such expressive interpretations. First, expressive ra-
tionales could be developed by individuals after the fact to justify their actions. Third, causal identifica-
                                                   
8 Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1999, 1996) propose a model where uninformed independent voters find it strategically optimal 
to abstain and delegate their vote to more informed voters. 
9 This paper follows Verba et al. (2000) in conceiving of political participation more broadly, as acts that are “intended to have 
the consequence of influencing the choice of governing official or the policies they make and implement” (pp. 245). 
10 In the context of rebellion, for instance, Lichbach (1995) emphasizes material incentives in the decision to engage in violent 
collective action. Alternatively, Petersen (2001), Ostrom (1990), Taylor (1988), and Popkin (1988, 1979) emphasizes social 
groups, norms and institutions, while Weinstein (2006) finds evidence for both material and social selective incentives. 
11 Other examples, especially concerning protest, include Muller et al. (1991), who find a correlation between dissatisfaction 
with public goods provision and protesting, as well as similar studies in West Germany and the U.S. argue that protesters re-
ceive psychological selective incentives from valuing public goods (e.g. Opp, 1988; Klosko et al., 1987; Muller and Opp, 1986).   6
tion is often poor, demonstrating correlation and not causation.12 Third, the available studies are sill lim-
ited in number and (with the exception of the rebellion literature) are based on experiences in the U.S. 
and Europe alone. Nevertheless, ideology, grievances, and moral outrage frequently offer a plausible and 
even convincing explanation for otherwise inexplicable collective action, and cannot be easily dismissed. 
 The link from war and violence to participation 
Each of the above theories offers a potential mechanism for linking war, violence, and participation. 
According to the simple rational model, abduction can influence participation if it results in differential 
private costs of participation. Abduction in Uganda resulted in decreased migration, diminished educa-
tion and economic opportunities, and increased injuries and psychological distress among abductees 
(Blattman & Annan, 2007), all of which could alter the calculus of voting by lowering its cost among 
former abductees.13 For community leadership in particular, abduction could also have a positive impact 
if it is associated with training or experience in leading others. Of course, abduction could diminish lead-
ership if it is associated with social stigmatization.  
Abduction and violence could also explain voting behavior in a mobilization model if it met two con-
ditions: first, if it is easily observed by political leaders; and second, if exposure to abduction or violence 
augments the ease of mobilization. Abduction in northern Uganda is associated with lower wealth and 
employment, lower literacy and education, and higher levels of distress (Blattman and Annan, 2007), 
each of which could make an abductee more susceptible to vote buying or pressure. To the extent that 
information-based theories are influential, however, lower education and literacy should have the oppo-
site impact, leading to lower turnout among abductees. 
Violence could also affect participation if it influences “social” or “expressive” preferences. For in-
stance, violence could directly affect psychological features of the individual. Post-traumatic growth the-
ory in psychology supports the notion that positive political and psychological responses to war violence 
are common, especially when young (e.g. Powell et al., 2003; Tedeschi and Calhoun, 1996). Some social 
                                                   
12 This is especially true of the voter turnout literature. A vast number of U.S. voter surveys find a strong correlation between 
participation and socio-economic traits such as income and education.12 These findings have supported a “socio-economic 
status model”, where participation is thought to be influenced by individual resources and civic attitudes (e.g. Verba et al., 
2000, Verba and Nie, 1972). Yet such studies are vulnerable to misspecification and causal identification problems, and are not 
empirically supported in non-Western contexts (e.g. Mattes and Bratton, 2003). 
13 Lower migration levels imply less re-registration and travel to vote, and stronger community connections (potentially needed 
for leading). Lower earnings and wealth may lower the opportunity cost of voting or being a community leader. Serious injuries 
or psychological distress, meanwhile, may make the act of voting or leading itself more costly or difficult.   7
preference theorists such as Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007) distrust such appeals to variation in psy-
chological traits and preferences, however. In their model, one’s social preference is a function only of 
the probability of one’s vote being pivotal and the size of the constituency—a simple setup that is con-
sistent with a broad range of turnout patterns across time and space. Unfortunately, such parsimonious 
models cannot explain the significant variation in turnout within a particular country and election. 
It is difficult to predict, however, how violence should affect psychology and preferences. On the one 
hand, if adversity stimulates solidarity, grievances and moral outrage, then participation should be in-
creasing in the intensity of exposure to that adversity. On the other hand, if adversity results in discour-
agement or disenfranchisement, then participation will diminish with violent exposure. 
A small but growing body of evidence suggests that the former case is dominant, including the post-
traumatic growth theory discussed above. Psychologists also routinely find youth resilient to violence and 
other trauma (e.g. Dyregrove et al., 2002; Masten, 2001; Ajdukovic & Ajdukovic, 1998; Nader et al., 
1993). Other evidence suggests that voters respond to other types of negative shocks with increased par-
ticipation. Bloom and Price (1975) show that U.S. voters are more likely to vote following negative mac-
roeconomic outcomes than positive ones, while Hastings et al. (2006) find that parents of school lottery 
losers were more likely to vote in later school board election than those of winners. A related literature 
has focused on how voters punish incumbent politicians for bad macroeconomic performance and re-
ward them for good, even when those events are beyond political control (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Markus, 
1988; Kramer, 1971). Voters even appear to punish incumbents for natural disasters, droughts, and shark 
attacks (Achen and Bartels, 2004). 
3.  War, abduction, and politics in northern Uganda 
To examine the impact of war and violence on participation, this paper draws on the experiences of 
youth embroiled in the twenty-year war in northern Uganda.  
The war in Uganda has both spiritual and political roots. In 1988, a spirit medium named Joseph Ko-
ny assembled the remnants of several failed insurgent groups from northern Uganda into a new guerrilla 
force, the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA.14 Locally Kony is believed to possess great spiritual powers, 
                                                   
14 This account is based on Allen (2005), Behrend (1999), Doom and Vlassenroot (1999), Finnström (2003), Lamwaka (2002), 
and Omara-Otunnu (1994).   8
and his stated goal is to seek a spiritual cleansing of the nation. Kony’s movement, however, is also 
rooted in a longstanding political grievance and economic disparity between northern ethnic groups (in-
cluding the Acholi, to which he and the bulk of the LRA belong) and ethnic groups from south-central 
Uganda. Following Independence, northern peoples came to dominate the military while southerners 
dominated the commercial sector, and until 1986 Uganda was governed by a series of brutal dictators 
from the north. In 1986, however, rebels from the southwest of the country led by Yoweri Museveni 
overthrew an Acholi-dominated government. Several guerrilla forces in the north initially resisted the 
takeover, but for the most part settled for peace or were defeated by 1988. The handful of fighters that 
would not settle for peace gathered under Kony to continue the fight.  
In spite of widespread antipathy for Museveni among the Acholi, Kony and the LRA attracted little 
popular support. The poverty and unpopularity of Kony’s movement limited his military options and 
ultimately accounts for the LRA’s total dependence on forcible recruitment. From its earliest days the 
rebels looted homes and abducted youth to obtain supplies and recruits. Many Acholi responded by join-
ing a government-sponsored local defense militia. To punish them for this betrayal, and to dissuade them 
from further collaboration, Kony ordered the massacre and mutilation of civilians. Thus from 1991 the 
war was waged not only against the government but against the Acholi populace at large.  
In 1994 the Sudanese government began supplying the LRA with supplies, weapons and territory 
upon which to build bases—support that enlarged and invigorated a small and weak LRA. Abduction 
from 1995 to 2004 was large-scale and indiscriminate, with at least 60,000 youth estimated to have been 
taken by the LRA for at least a day (Annan et al., 2006). The majority of these abductees were adolescent 
males, though men and women of all ages were commonly taken.  
Twenty percent of male abductees did not return and sadly can be presumed perished (as few remain 
with the LRA). The remaining 80 percent escaped, were released, or were rescued after periods of a day 
up to ten years. Roughly half of these ‘returnees’ reported to and were demobilized by the Ugandan army 
(the UPDF), and two in five returnees passed through a ‘reception center’ that provided basic health ser-
vices, family relocation, and reinsertion. In 2006 the Government of Uganda and the LRA reached a 
truce and peace talks continue.  
The two decades of instability and economic destruction in the north stand in stark contrast to the 
success and stability of the rest of Uganda. Outside Acholiland, violence has abated, infrastructure has   9
expanded, HIV infection rates have fallen, and economic growth has been a robust 6 percent for the past 
decade (Government of Uganda, 2007). Moreover, the country has become gradually more free and de-
mocratic. President Museveni introduced single-party democracy in 1996, and was elected and re-elected 
in 1996, 2001 and 2006 under moderately free and fair elections.15 
In 2005, Museveni proposed constitutional amendments which would allow for multi-party democ-
racy as well as eliminate term limits, allowing him to run again. A peaceful national referendum was held 
in August 2005 on the question of multi-party politics—just two weeks before our survey began.16 47 
percent of eligible voters turned out, with 92 percent voting in favor of the amendments (IFES, 2007). 
4.  Data & measurement 
The data come from Phase I of the Survey of War Affected Youth, or SWAY—an original, represen-
tative survey of 741 rural male youth (ages 14 to 30) in the Acholi districts of Kitgum and Pader, 
Uganda. Both districts (and thus the full sample) are ethnically, linguistically, and religiously homoge-
nous.17 Surveys were administered by local enumerators in eight rural sub-counties between September 
2005 and March 2006. Former abductees were over-sampled, with 462 interviewed in total. 
The survey sought to select its respondents from a sample frame of youth living in the region before 
the conflict in order to minimize sample attrition due to the migration and mortality. 1100 households 
were sampled from U.N. World Food Programme lists compiled in 2002, and 92.5 percent of these 
household heads were successfully tracked down and interviewed.18 Enumerators then worked with 
household heads to develop a retrospective roster of all youth living in the household in 1996. The year 
1996 was chosen as it was easily recalled as the date of the first election since 1980, and because it dates 
to the time of the war’s escalation (and pre-dates 85 percent of local abductions).  
A sample of 870 surviving youth was drawn from this retrospective roster of youth. Of these youth, 
41 percent had moved since 1996 and were followed across the country to their current location. 741 of 
                                                   
15 Official election results suggest that Museveni received 59 percent of the 2006 national vote share. (IFES, 2007) 
16 This referendum asked voters: "Do you agree to open up the political space to allow those who wish to join different organi-
zations/parties to do so to compete for political power?" 
17 Virtually the entire population of the Districts are ethnically and linguistically Acholi (Luo) and all virtually are Christian (al-
though these a mix of Catholic, Anglican, Evangelical, and Pentecostal faiths). 
18 Potential selection arises from the 7.5 percent of households not located, as well as from the fact that the sample frame dates 
from 2002 (by which time many households may have had the opportunity to out-migrate). Interviews with community leaders 
suggest that very few households left the region entirely before 2002—most left family members (especially parents) behind, 
who remain on the lists. Many migrants also took pains to get onto these lists in 2002 even when away to increase food rations.    10
sampled youth (or 84 percent) were located, including virtually all non-migrants and 70 percent of mi-
grants. Absentee questionnaires were conducted with the families of all 129 unfound young men, collect-
ing extensive data on current outcomes and abduction experiences in order to adjust for observed attri-
tion. Demographic data were also collected on the 349 youth from the retrospective roster that had died 
or not returned from abduction.  
Measuring war and abduction experiences 
The survey collected self-reported, retrospective information on war and abduction experiences, de-
scribed in Table 1. More than two in five male youth reported an Abduction of any length. Many of these 
abductions were short, usually because the youth was too young or too old to be kept as a recruit, and so 
was quickly released after showing the way or carrying looted goods. Indeed, a third of abductions were 
less than two weeks in length, and just half were longer than six weeks. The number of Months abducted 
ranged as long as 120 (or 10 years) in the sample, with the average abduction lasting 8.5 months.  
Even short abductions could be quite traumatic, however; youth abducted two weeks or fewer re-
ported experiencing nearly seven violent acts on average. The survey asked respondents directly about 26 
specific Violent acts experienced, including 12 Violent acts received, 9 Violent acts perpetrated by the respondent 
himself, and 5 Violent acts upon the family of the respondent.19 The average youth reported 6.6 violent acts 
experienced, with abductees reporting 9.8 acts to non-abductees’ 4.2 acts (Table 1). Other war experi-
ences are displayed in Table 1, including a youth’s Age at abduction and percentages that Carried a firearm or 
held a Leadership role in the rebel group. 
Measuring participation 
Current socio-political outcomes are listed in Table 2. Our main measures of political participation 
are voting, community leadership, and holding of political jobs. 44 percent of the youth over age 18 
                                                   
19 Acts received include: witnessing an attack or battle; witnessing beatings or torture of others; witnessing a killing; witnessing 
a massacre; witnessing rape; witnessing the torching of occupied homes; forced labor; receiving a severe beating; being attacked 
with a weapon; being tied or locked up; and receiving a serious injury in a battle or attack. Acts perpetrated include: forced to 
kill a soldier; forced to beat a civilian; forced to beat a family member or friend; forced to kill a civilian; forced to kill a family 
member or friend; forced to have sex with a woman; and forced to abuse dead bodies. Violence upon family includes: a parent 
was abducted; another family member was abducted;  a family member was injured in combat or by landmines; and, a parent 
was murdered or died violently.   11
Voted in the 2005 referendum (with the 238 underage youth omitted from the voting analysis).20 Four per-
cent of youth also report that they are currently a Community mobilizer—volunteer members of the com-
munity who are responsible for gathering the community together for political and community meet-
ings.21 This role is one of the most common forms of leadership in the community among adolescents 
and young adults. The youth were also asked about other forms of political employment, but only 4 of 
the respondents (0.4 percent) reported holding such a Political job. 
Other indicators of community participation and collective action were also recorded. 42 percent re-
port Membership in at least one community group, including Peace groups (7 percent), Water management committees 
(1.3 percent), Cultural groups (16 percent), Sports teams (12 percent), Farmer’s cooperatives (9 percent), School 
clubs and committees (5 percent), and Church or bible study groups (18 percent).22 81 percent also Attend church 
regularly, and 4 percent of youth Volunteer for a community organization. Finally, an important part of social 
life involves cooperation with and obedience to elders. 7 percent indicated that they “sometimes” or “of-
ten” Disobeyed elders. 
5.  The causal impact of abduction on participation 
Estimating the impacts of military service and war violence is a challenging task. In the case of re-
cruitment into armed groups, combatants are usually unlike non-combatants in unobservable ways, and a 
comparison of their behavior is likely to conflate the impact of war with any pre-existing differences that 
led the youth to join or be selected by the armed group. We are particularly concerned that characteris-
tics typically associated with participation in armed groups (such as poverty, social exclusion, ideological 
commitment, or malleability) are traits that also affect social consciousness or political activity.  
                                                   
20 Selection into voting eligibility is based on an observed and exogenous factor, year of birth, and classifying underage youth as 
“missing” does not bias the results, but merely changes the interpretation of the treatment effect as the impact conditional 
being eligible to vote. 
21 Each five years, or when a position otherwise becomes available, a community meeting is held and a call is made for nomina-
tions. Nominees are given a chance to give a short speech, and are typically elected by a show of hands or by lining up behind 
the nominees. Community mobilizers are unpaid, although they may occasionally receive small tokens of thanks (e.g. food 
rations or household items) from the NGOs for which they mobilize community members. 
22 Virtually all report themselves as Christian: 71 percent Catholic, 19 percent Anglican, 9 percent Pentecostal or Evangelical, 
and less than one percent other (either “No religion” or traditional religion)   12
Empirical strategy 
One solution to this potential endogeneity is the counterfactual approach, whereby a relevant control 
group is found for the war-affected (or “treated”) individuals. The impact, or average treatment effect 
(ATE), is estimated by taking the difference in the outcomes of the treated and controls (Imbens, 2004; 
Rubin, 1974). The estimated ATE is only as reliable as the counterfactual, and it will be unbiased only 
when treatment assignment (in this instance, rebel recruitment) is conditionally unconfounded. That is, 
any selection into treatment must be on observed and measured characteristics and otherwise independ-
ent of potential outcomes (Imbens, 2004; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1978).  
Evidence for the conditional unconfoundedness of abduction in Uganda 
In most armed conflicts, such stringent identification conditions would be unlikely to hold. Evidence 
from northern Uganda, however, suggests that the LRA’s large-scale and indiscriminate use of abduction 
and violence tragically provide a natural experiment where abduction and (to a lesser extent) violence 
experienced are unrelated to personal characteristics and potential participation. 
Rebel testimonies provide the first indication that the most common types of selection into armed 
groups are not present in the case of the LRA. First, volunteering for the LRA (i.e. self-selection into the 
armed group) was virtually unknown; volunteers likely comprised less than 0.5 percent of all LRA re-
cruits. Nearly all of these volunteers joined before 1991, however, and the majority appear to have come 
from the neighboring district of Gulu, however, so none were captured in our sample.  
Second, interviews with the leaders of LRA raiding parties suggest that by neither design nor accident 
did they abduct a select group of youth. Abduction targets were unplanned and arbitrary, and home-
steads were raided regardless of wealth and household composition. From their Sudanese bases, rebels 
ventured into Uganda for several weeks at a time in small groups of roughly 15 fighters. Raiding parties 
had two aims: ambushing government forces, and raiding homesteads along their path for food and new 
recruits. Typical of East Africa, nearly all Acholi households live in relatively isolated homesteads in their 
fields, arrangements which made them particularly vulnerable to LRA raids. Rebels usually invaded such 
homesteads at night, abducting all able-bodied members of the household to carry looted goods. These 
abduction parties were under instruction to release only young children and older adults, but to keep all 
adolescent and young adult males. Fewer than 5 percent of males abducted between the ages of 10 and 
24 report being released. Abductions were large-scale, with thousands of youth taken every year.   13
The survey data support such claims of indiscriminate abduction. The survey gathered data on pre-
war levels of household wealth (including land, livestock, and plows), parent’s education, father’s occupa-
tion, and parental death—traits that are believed to be reliable predictors of participation in armed 
groups in Africa (e.g. Honwana, 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994).  
We observe little difference in these pre-war traits by abduction status, yet these same traits are strong 
predictors of participation in the national military. Examine first the means of each of these pre-war 
traits for abducted and non-abducted youth (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3) as well as the unconditional 
and conditional mean differences between the two groups (Columns 3 and 4). Excepting year of birth, 
nearly all of the unconditional differences are close to zero and none are significant at even the 10 per-
cent level. Conditional mean differences, which control for all other pre-treatment covariates, are gener-
ally insignificant as well. Abducted youth differ only by year of birth and pre-war household size. The 
explanatory power of year of birth is expected, as a youth’s probability of ever being abducted depended 
on how many years of the conflict he fell within the rebels’ target age range. Abduction levels also varied 
over time, and so youth of some ages were vulnerable for longer than others. Meanwhile, the significance 
of household size is driven entirely by households greater than 25 in number, which perhaps implies that 
the small bands of raiders were hesitant to raid large and difficult-to-control households.23 
The inability of these pre-war traits to predict abduction can be contrasted with their success in pre-
dicting government military service: participation in a voluntary government militia, or Local Defense 
Units (LDU). Five percent of youth were current or past LDU members. A comparison of pre-war traits 
in Table 3, Columns 5 to 8, suggests that militia members came from poorer and more agricultural 
households. Collectively our pre-war covariates strongly predict government militia membership—a test 
of the joint significance of all pre-war traits in predicting LDU membership yields a p-value of 0.02. 
Moreover, the coefficients in the militia participation regressions are much more sizable than in the ab-
duction likelihood ones. The ability of these pre-war traits to significantly predict militia participation but 
not abduction is striking, and lends support to the case for unconfounded abduction. 
                                                   
23 All of the difference in the distributions of abducted and non-abducted youth is driven by year and location of birth. The 
addition of other pre-war covariates to a logit regression of abduction on age and location indicators leaves the distribution of 
the predicted probabilities undisturbed. An F-test of their joint significance yields a p-value of 0.18 (not statistically significant).   14
Dealing with selective attrition and survival 
A final challenge is that any association between participation and war experiences may be biased by 
selective attrition. In this study, there are two main types of ‘attritors’: non-survivors and unfound mi-
grants. We are concerned because our estimates of the impact of abduction will be biased if personal 
qualities that determine survival also influence later social and political behavior. Plausible candidates 
include intelligence, self-confidence, or the tenacity to resist abduction. In general, studies of survey attri-
tion in developing countries have concluded that attrition due to death or migration has little impact on 
coefficient estimates, even with attrition rates up to 50 percent (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Falaris, 2003). 
The tracking success rate of this study, 84 percent, meets or exceeds the rates achieved by several ‘gold-
standard’ youth tracking surveys in poor countries (e.g. Hamory and Miguel, 2006; Thomas et al., 2001). 
Even so, differential attrition rates by treatment status still raise some concern; mortality rates were dou-
ble among the abducted, while out-migration rates were double among the non-abducted. 
To correct for attrition on observables, enumerators collected demographic data and data on current 
activities and well-being from the surviving family members of any attritors. Following Fitzgerald et al. 
(1998), these data were used to calculate attrition probabilities, and regression estimates are weighted by 
the inverse of these attrition probabilities to eliminate bias from attrition on observed traits. Even with 
this correction, however, there remains a risk of bias arising from any unobserved traits that influence 
survival, abduction, and potential outcomes. In the sensitivity analysis below, the ATE is bounded with 
best- and worst-case scenarios to see if the estimates are robust to such potential bias. 
Results: The ATE of abduction 
Assuming conditional unconfoundedness, consistent estimates of the ATE can be calculated using an 
index model such as the probit. A more efficient and consistent approach, however, is to weight on the 
inverse of a nonparametric estimate of the propensity score (Hirano et al., 2003). In this instance, Y* is a 
latent variable describing an individual i’s propensity for participation, and the researcher observes a bi-
nary participation outcome, Y. The treatment effect can be estimated by the following regression: 
P(Yi = 1) = Ф(τ · Ti + XSi · β1), (1)   15
where the treatment indicator T equals one if youth i was abducted, and the XS are the subset of covari-
ates X that are significantly correlated with Y, conditional on treatment.24 The resulting ATEs, repre-
sented by τ and summarized in Table 4, suggest that abduction causes higher political participation and 
activity but has little effect on non-political forms of political participation.25 
To begin, abduction leads to an increase of 8.5 percentage points in the likelihood that an eligible 
youth (one who is 18 or older) voted in the 2005 referendum (Column 2), and is significant at the one 
percent level. Since just 39 percent of eligible non-abducted youth voted (Column 1), this ATE repre-
sents a 22 percent increase in voting (Column 3).  
Abduction also leads to a 3.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a youth is a community 
mobilizer. Relative to the non-abducted mean of 2 percent, this represents a 145 percent increase, also 
significant at the one percent level.  
Abduction is also associated with an eightfold increase in the likelihood of holding a political job. 
This estimate, however, is statistically significant at only the ten percent level, and is based on only four 
respondents reporting such employment (three of whom are former abductees). We therefore must be 
cautious about the causal effect on political jobs. Nevertheless, the direction and magnitude of the result 
is certainly consistent with the other political results. 
Turning to others forms of community participation, the causal impacts of abduction on group 
membership and church membership in Table 4 are generally small and not statistically significant (even 
though large numbers of both abducted and non-abducted youth participate). Looking at specific groups 
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where ρi and πi are sampling and attrition weights, and ê(vi) is a nonparametric estimate of the propensity score. A series estima-
tor for the propensity score achieves the efficiency bound (Hirano et al., 2003). It requires linear regression of treatment as-
signment on each covariate in X. Those covariates that pass a threshold t-statistic of 1.0 are included in XS. Inverse selection 
weights are normalized so that differences between the inverse ê(v) and one sum to one within each treatment group. The vi are 
the subset of the covariates Xi that have substantial correlation with the treatment (Hirano et al., 2003). 
25 An alternative approach would stack the ATE regression equations for each participation outcome and run the regressions 
simultaneously as seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs). This process can offer efficiency gains as well as allow simultaneous 
testing of hypotheses (such as the nonzero impact of abduction on political participation and the zero impact of abduction on 
non-political participation). An SUR model with a linear age term as a control for conditional unconfoundedness produces 
results that are consistent with those in Table 4, and confirms the joint significance of political participation (and non-
significance of non-political participation). However, an SUR model that accounts for the non-linear selection effect of year 
and location of birth does not achieve convergence. Accounting for these non-linear selection effects are of singular impor-
tance, and so the less biased (but less efficient) individually-estimated regression estimates are displayed in Table 4.   16
or activities, the difference in group participation between abductees and non-abductees is generally 
small and never statistically significant.  
Only in one instance, peace groups, is there a significant impact of abduction: abducted youth are 3.8 
percentage points more likely to participate in such groups, an increase of 73 percent over non-
abductees. Peace groups are clubs of youth that stage cultural dances, dramatic presentations, debates, 
and talks, often with peace-building or reconciliation themes. There are three possible explanations for 
this causal effect. First, some youth join or start these clubs independently, while others are organized by 
schools and international NGOs. In both cases formerly abducted youth may be targeted to take part to 
facilitate reintegration. Second, higher participation by the abducted could also reflect a disproportionate 
interest in peace activities or in signaling their peacefulness to the community. Third, an interest in peace 
clubs (and not other cultural or community groups) could reflect the same predilection for political par-
ticipation we observed in voting and leadership. 
Finally, there is little evidence of an impact on social relations. Abductees were 3.6 percent more like-
ly to disobey elders, but the estimate is not statistically significant. Moreover, as discussed in Blattman 
and Annan (2007), abductees report almost no difference in levels of aggression and social support.26 
Robustness of the ATEs  
The ATE estimates in Table 4 are all highly robust to alternative regression models, controls, and 
weights. The ATEs for five of the outcomes are recalculated under alternative models in Table 5. The 
original ATEs (reproduced in Column 1 of Table 5) are robust to the removal of pre-war household 
traits (Column 2), and removal of year and location of birth (Column 3), although standard errors in-
crease and statistical significance diminishes somewhat with no controls whatsoever. Reintroducing the 
control variables, the original results are robust to omission of the selection, or inverse propensity score, 
weights (Column 4), as well as elimination of the attrition correction (Column 5). The unweighted re-
gressions are further robust to elimination of pre-war controls (Colum 6) and again the elimination of 
                                                   
26 It is worth noting that the above results do not prove that non-political forms of participation are not impacted by abduc-
tion. Rather, we merely fail to reject that (null) hypothesis. Several of estimated ATEs on non-political participation in Table 4 
are positive, but have a low level of statistical significance. If non-political forms of participation are systematically noisier or 
less variant than political participation, then we may not have the statistical power to identify a positive relationship between 
abduction and non-political participation. Even if true, however, the basic conclusions of the analysis hold; abduction affects 
political participation more consistently and more substantively than non-political forms of participation. The relative impact 
of abduction is unlikely to be disproven by more statistical power.   17
age and location controls (Columns 7 and 8). The latter regression is a simple difference of means, and 
implies similar, and in fact larger, treatment effects than displayed in Table 4. Use of alternative models, 
such as the logit or linear probability models, given similar results as well (not displayed). 
Sensitivity of the identification strategy 
In spite of the evidence presented above, several plausible sources of unobserved selection into the 
LRA exist, including less clever youth “self-selecting” into the LRA because of a poorer ability to hide, 
or survival of only the physically strongest. Such selection could lead to overestimation of the ATEs—
bias that would arise from the systematic selection of more politically active youth into the rebel group, 
or from differentially greater death or attrition of less politically-inclined abductees. While there is no 
obvious reason for either case to be true, it cannot be proven otherwise. What can be estimated, how-
ever, is the degree of selection that would be necessary to generate the ATEs we observe, which can then 
be judged as plausible or implausible. Two means of such sensitivity analysis are presented in an Appen-
dix. A first method, based on Imbens (2003), explicitly model relaxations of the unconfoundedness as-
sumption and finds that moderate amounts of unobserved selection are highly unlikely to account for 
the treatment effects observed (see the Appendix and Figure 1). A second method, based on Lee (2005), 
estimates “best-case” and “worst-case” scenarios for attrition, and finds that even in the (unlikely) worst-
case, the sign of the treatment effects remain intact (see the Appendix and Table 10). 
6.  Unpacking the causal effects using heterogeneous treatments 
Evidence that conscription into a rebel force is associated with political engagement rather than apa-
thy or exclusion is important and useful information, but the reasons for such a relationship—the causal 
mechanism—is even more interesting. One means of uncovering this mechanism is to examine the ef-
fects of heterogeneity. Abduction by the LRA represents a bundle of experiences, including exposure to 
varying violence, time away from school and work, military training, indoctrination, and leadership. To 
the extent that it is these underlying and varying experiences that account for the observed relationship 
between abduction and violence, we should observe a significant correlation between their incidence and 
political participation. The results suggest that the principal mechanism by which abduction impacts po-
litical participation is through violent acts received.   18
Empirical strategy 
In order to unpack the causal impact of abduction on participation, we can confine our analysis to the 
abducted alone and examine treatment heterogeneity. Specifically, we can estimate a probit model of a 
participation indicator, Y, on a set of observable and measured war experiences, including our measures 
of violence, V, abduction length, L, and a vector of other abduction experiences, Z, including age of ab-
duction, having carried a firearm, and holding a leadership position (defined and summarized in Table 1):  
P(Yi = 1) = Ф(Vi · δ1 + δ2 · ln(L)i + Zi ·δ3 + Xi ·δ4+ μi)      if Ti = 1.  (2) 
For the estimated coefficients on the elements of V, L, and Z to have a causal interpretation, their inci-
dence must be assumed to be conditionally unconfounded. Yet while abduction itself was shown to be 
arguably exogenous, these war experiences are less plausibly so. The length of abduction, a youth’s ease 
of indoctrination, or his inclination to commit violence are plausibly related to underlying traits unob-
servable to the researcher. If these traits are themselves associated with later social and political participa-
tion, then any relationship between participation and war experiences will conflate the effect of these 
pre-existing differences with the causal impact of the war experience itself. A linear regression of violent 
acts experienced on pre-abduction traits, for instance, suggests that these variables are of some but weak 
influence (Table 6).27 The coefficients are substantively quite small, suggesting that selection into vio-
lence is minor. We are not fully confident that violence is unconfounded, however, and so the results 
from Equation 2 must be interpreted with caution.28 
In examining the influence of violence experienced we should also consider the potential effects of 
systematic measurement error. Our measures of violence record incidence and not frequency, and so will 
understate the number of acts ever experienced. Moreover, some individuals may be hesitant to report 
the most extreme acts of violence, especially violence perpetrated.29 If true, the consequence of such 
measurement error will be to: (i) increase standard errors (reducing the precision of any tests); and (ii) 
                                                   
27 In Column 2 of Table 4, the regression allows for non-linear relations between the pre-war traits and violence, through the 
use of fourth-order terms and dummy variables. Four orders of household size are jointly significant at the one percent level, a 
dummy for plow ownership is significant at the 10 percent level, and all pre-war traits are jointly significant at the 1 percent 
level, although in all cases the selection appears substantively small. 
28 We are most concerned about overstating the relationship between violence and participation, a situation that would arise 
from unobserved factors that are significantly associated with both violence and participation in the same direction. 
29 The direction and magnitude of any such reporting error is unknown, of course. Based on personal interviews and experi-
ence with formerly abducted young males, the author’s impression is that a moderate degree of under-reporting of violence 
perpetrated is not unlikely because of shame or timidity. It is also conceivable that those in “public life” are less like to report 
perpetrating violence, and may even be more likely to report victimization. Based on personal interviews, the author feels this 
possibility is unlikely, especially in the context of a leadership position as junior as that of a community mobilizer.    19
bias the coefficient on violence towards zero. Thus the estimates should be considered a lower bound on 
the influence of violence on participation. 
Results 
The largest and most consistent determinant of political participation in the sample is the number of 
violent acts received. Among the abducted, each additional act of violence received is associated with a 
2.9 percentage point increase in the probability of voting and a 1.2 percentage point increase in the prob-
ability of being a community mobilizer (Table 7, Columns 1 and 2).The average abducted youth reports 
4.3 more acts of violence received than non-abducted youth, implying that violence received from ab-
duction is associated a 12.5 percentage point increase in voting (from a non-abducted base of 39 percent) 
and a 5.2 percentage point increase in community leadership (from a base of 2 percent). These effects are 
roughly comparable to (albeit greater than) the respective ATEs from Table 4. 
Meanwhile, violence received is weakly and inconsistently related to non-political participation (see 
Table 7, Columns 3 to 13). Group membership is positively but not statistically significantly associated 
with violence received. Looking at individual activities and groups, sports team membership and church 
attendance are negatively correlated with violence received, while being a member of a farmer’s group, 
school club, or church group are positively correlated (albeit sometimes weakly). The other of participa-
tion forms have little significant association with violence received. 
Violent acts perpetrated are negatively correlated with political participation, although neither point 
estimate is statistically significant. As noted earlier, this coefficient could be biased towards zero to the 
extent that it is systematically underreported. Only a dramatic amount of underreporting could make vio-
lence perpetrated as influential as violence received, however. 
Violent acts upon the family, however, are strongly positively associated with both voting and mobili-
zation, although the result is significant only in the mobilization case. The overall effect and explanatory 
power of family violence is substantively small, though, since the average number of acts of family vio-
lence is small in number (2.0, from Table 1) and since the difference between abducted and non-
abducted youth is very small (about 0.2 acts). 
Violence perpetrated is, however, strongly associated with being a member of a peace group and with 
church attendance. The effect is substantively largest for peace group membership, however; the average 
abducted youth reports one act of violence perpetrated, which is associated with a 1.9 percentage point   20
increase in peace group membership on a non-abducted base of 5 percent—almost half of the treatment 
effect seen in Table 4. 
Longer abductions seem to be associated with lower levels of political and especially group participa-
tion, although not always significantly. After controlling for violence, the natural logarithm of abduction 
length is inversely (but not statistically significantly) associated political participation. This inverse rela-
tionship is larger and more statistically significant in the case of community group participation, espe-
cially cultural groups, farmer’s groups, and school groups. These general results hold for alternative 
transformations of abduction length (not displayed).  
Turning to the other measured war experiences, none are as robustly and as consistently related to 
our measures of political participation as violence received. Abduction age is hardly associated with any 
form of participation. Having ever carried a firearm in the LRA is not associated with political participa-
tion either, although it is positively associated with cultural group membership and disobeying elders. 
Having held a rank or similar leadership position in the LRA (just 7 percent of our sample, in all cases 
very junior ranks such as sergeant or lieutenant) is negatively associated with several forms of participa-
tion—voting, community group membership, church attendance, and disobedience of elders. Leadership 
in the rebel group is positively associated with community mobilization, on the other hand, but not sta-
tistically significantly so in this specification. In other specifications, the relationship is occasionally sig-
nificant. It is unclear, however, whether this is a causal effect of leadership experience in the LRA on 
later leadership, or whether pre-abduction leadership aptitude is driving both behaviors. Interviews with 
a reception center social worker, who also worked as an election poll supervisor during the previous two 
elections, suggest that these leadership experiences are not immaterial. In his experience, formerly ab-
ducted youth “feel like they can take control of their lives.” Former abductees, he continued, “are sub-
jected to hardship where… they mature very fast.” Moreover, they “comfortably speak their views in a 
group of people or a crowd.” Such a view suggests that leadership may explain part of the treatment ef-
fect. The part it explains, however, may be quite small owing to the rarity of formal leadership experience 
in the LRA. 
Further evidence on the causal mechanism 
The above analysis suggests that violent acts received are the principal mechanism by which abduc-
tion impacts political participation. This proposition can be further tested: if violent acts received are the   21
primary causal mechanism, they should eliminate the explanatory power of abduction when included in 
the abduction ATE regression (Equation 1). The coefficient on abduction should fall to zero, and the 
coefficient on violent acts received should be positive and significant. 
We test the hypothesis on three dependent variables: voting, community mobilization, and commu-
nity group membership (see Table 8). For each dependent variable, the abduction ATE regression from 
Table 4 is replicated in the first column, and the second column introduces violent acts received and 
length of abduction to the regression. Months abducted is used in tandem with violent acts received as in 
order to reduce (but not eliminate) potential bias from omitted variables and endogeneity. 
In the case of voting, the coefficient on abduction falls from 0.085 to 0.040 when violent acts are in-
troduced, and the coefficient on violent acts is 0.018 (Table 8, Columns 1 and 2). Individually both coef-
ficients are not significant, but they are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. This pattern is consistent 
with the hypothesis that violence “explains” the impact of abduction. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the 
possibility that abduction holds explanatory power over voting independent of violent acts received. 
The results are more conclusive for community mobilization, where the coefficient on abduction falls 
from 0.033 (significant at the one percent level) to 0.010 (and not significant) when violence is intro-
duced. The coefficient on violence, meanwhile, is 0.007 (significant at the one percent level). Abducted 
youth report four more acts of violence than their non-abducted peers, implying a 2.8 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of being a mobilizer that is almost identical to the 2.3 percentage point drop in 
the abduction coefficient. 
According to our hypothesis, neither abduction nor violence should be associated with non-political 
forms of participation. The results in Table 8 are consistent with this conjecture. Looking at regressions 
of community group membership on abduction alone (Column 5) and with violence received (Column 
6) we find all coefficients to be small and individually and jointly not statistically significant. 
7.  Alternative explanations and mechanisms 
The mechanism linking violence and participation is difficult to test directly, not least because social 
and expressive preferences or the mobilization activities of leaders are difficult to observe and measure. 
The qualitative and quantitative evidence can nevertheless help us weigh competing accounts.   22
The mobilization of youth by elites or political parties is common across Africa, and it is conceivable 
that formerly abducted youth could have been targeted for voter turnout and community leadership by 
these elites. Several patterns and pieces of evidence, however, suggest that this explanation is unlikely. At 
the time of the survey, Uganda was a single party state. The ruling party was intensely unpopular in the 
Acholi region (in multi-party Presidential elections the following year, fewer than 5 percent supported 
the ruling party) and few mobilization efforts were observed by the author or his team of local research 
assistants, especially of formerly abducted youth. At the time of voting, the future opposition parties 
were not allowed to organize or mobilize, and did not visibly do so (in fact, mobilization of any nature 
on voting day is outlawed). Moreover, the entire survey population was internally displaced at the time of 
survey, and ruling party and opposition party political organizations were weak at best in the displace-
ment camps. None of the interviewed community leaders could recall any significant voter mobilization 
activities, and none agreed with the idea that formerly abducted youth were targeted by elites (and, if any-
thing, suggested the opposite might be true). Elections to become a community mobilizer, meanwhile, 
are held outside the normal political cycle on a sporadic and periodic basis, and are unrelated to political 
party or affiliation. No community leaders interviewed could recall interference from political elites or 
discussion of party affiliations during these informal elections. 
The ability of political elites to mobilize formerly abducted youth is also contingent upon the ability 
of political leaders to identify their target group. In northern Uganda, however, voting and being a com-
munity mobilizer ate not correlated with abduction experiences that are easily observed or common 
knowledge in the community, such as whether a youth has been abducted, for how long, or whether he 
received an injury there. Rather, participation is primarily associated with exposure to violence, which is 
difficult to observe and often known only to the youth in question.  
Other patterns in the data also fail to support the rational actor and social preferences theories. The 
social preferences model from Edlin et al. (2007) predicts that individuals who vote should also be more 
likely to make other social contributions, such as charitable donations. While donations are not especially 
relevant in a displaced persons camp, we do measure contributions to public goods (such as participation 
in school and water management committees) and volunteering for an NGO. Yet as we saw in Tables 4 
and 5, none are positively and significantly associated with abduction or violence in the sample.   23
The relationship between leadership in the rebel group and becoming a community mobilizer might 
be construed as evidence for the rational model of participation. In this view, leadership experience is a 
part of military training, and either augments the private returns to leadership or reduces the private cost. 
(Of course, an argument could be made that such experience augments social or expressive preferences. 
Such is the hazard of preference-based explanations.) Regardless of the specific mechanism at work, the 
evidence suggests that leadership experience can indeed account for at least part of the observed impact 
on later community leadership.30 Such experience cannot, however, account for the larger and more ro-
bust relationship between violence and mobilization, and so is only a partial explanation. 
Finally, note that from a mechanical point of view, any other factor that could plausibly lead to the 
impact of abduction on political participation must meet three conditions: (1) it must differ between ab-
ducted and non-abducted youth (that is, there must be a significant treatment effect of abduction on the 
factor itself); (2) it must also be a determinant of voting and community leadership; and (3) it must not 
influence non-political forms of participation. Each of the theories of participation we have discussed 
possess a number of plausible proxies in our data that can be tested against these three criteria. The 
proxies are not exhaustive, but together the patterns we observe fail to support the mobilization, rational 
actor, and social preferences explanations for the abduction treatment effect.  
For the simple rational model we desire measures of the individual’s shoe leather and opportunity 
costs of participation. Proxies for shoe leather costs include indicators for no longer living in one’s dis-
trict of origin—for instance having Migrated to a town or Migrated out of district. We proxy for health condi-
tions that impede participation using an Injury indicator and an indicator for being in the Top quartile of emo-
tional distress proxy. Finally, the opportunity cost of voting is proxied by an asset index, days employed, and 
gross earnings. 
The social preferences model, as noted, supposes that the individual holds social or altruistic prefer-
ences. As noted above, in this setting we might expect such preferences to be associated with Membership 
in community groups and Volunteering for an NGO, and possibly with Church attendance as well. The survey also 
contained a psychosocial questionnaire that measured culturally appropriate pro-social attitudes and be-
haviors—including whether the youth feels that he is helpful to elders, helpful to younger youth, cares 
                                                   
30 While its role may be overestimated by endogenous selection into leadership, its role could also be underestimated in that 
there is leadership training and experience that we do not observe.   24
for his peers, shares freely with other youth, and enjoys of community participation. An indicator for 
being in the Bottom quartile of pro-social behavior might capture whether a youth places value on his commu-
nity. Finally, we might expect an inverse relationship between social preferences and social exclusion, 
measured by an Index of 17 forms of social support received and an indicator for reporting Poor family relations. 
Last, levels of political information and understanding, central to information-based explanations of 
participation, can be proxied by indicators for Functional literacy, Radio ownership, and Educational attainment. 
Table 9 assesses the relative explanatory power of each of these potential proxies for the participation 
cost, social preferences, or information-based theories. Our indices of violence are included as well. The 
results are striking. None of the proxies meet more than one of the three criteria. Indeed, even after con-
trolling for these factors, violence continues to explain the vast bulk of the observed treatment effect—
approximately 77 percent of the voting ATE and 145 percent of the mobilization ATE versus a (statisti-
cally not significant) -22 percent of the community group membership ATE. 
The impacts of abduction on violence received and each of the proxies mentioned above is displayed 
in Column 1 of Table 9.31 The coefficients from a probit regression of the political participation meas-
ures on violence received and each of the proxies are displayed in Columns 2 and 4.32 Finally, the relative 
influence of each determinant on the voting and leadership ATEs is listed in Columns 3 and 5 (calcu-
lated as the abduction ATE in Column 1, multiplied by the relationship with participation in Column 2 
or 4, divided by the relevant ATE from Table 4). 
In virtually all the cases where abduction has a substantive and significant impact on a factor (such as 
educational attainment), the relationship between that determinant and voting or mobilization is small 
and statistically insignificant. Where the determinant has a robust relationship with participation (such as 
that between earnings and voting), there is a small and statistically not significant impact of abduction on 
the determinant. As a consequence, for the vast majority of potential determinants, their ability to ex-
plain the ATE appears close to zero (Columns 3 and 5). In the case of mobilization, serious injuries are 
the only factor that exhibit a statistically significant relationship with both abduction and participation, 
but this relationship is negative (abduction decreases the likelihood of participation when it causes injury) 
and relatively modest (equivalent to -19 percent of the mobilization ATE).  
                                                   
31 As with the participation ATEs, they represent the coefficient on abduction in a regression of each determinant on an ab-
duction indicator, year and location of birth indicators and interactions, and pre-war household traits. 
32 Year and location of birth indicators and interactions are included in also both these regressions but are not displayed.   25
All the above estimates are undoubtedly prone to bias from omitted variables, measurement error or 
endogeneity. Even if greatly underestimated, however, their ability to explain abduction’s impact on par-
ticipation would continue to be low.  
The clearest exception is violence received. Abductees report 4.3 more acts of violence received than 
non-abductees (significant at the one percent level). Moreover, each act of violence inflicted is associated 
with a 1.5 percentage point increase in voting and a 1.1 percentage point increase in mobilization activi-
ties. This excess violence corresponds to 77 percent of the voting ATE and 145 percent of the mobiliza-
tion ATE— much larger magnitudes than the estimated influence of the other factors (none of which 
display statistical significance in both abduction and participation impacts). Violence is so influential rela-
tive to the other potential determinants that even dramatic amounts of bias from potential unobservables 
or endogeneity would not likely change violence’s central role in determining participation. 
8.  Discussion and Conclusions 
What are we to conclude from this analysis? The data imply a large and robust causal impact of ab-
duction on political participation in northern Uganda, mediated it seems by violence received. Several 
theories of behavior—simple rationality, social preference, mobilization, and information-based explana-
tions—could in theory generate the abduction-participation link. None are supported by the patterns we 
observe, however. We do not see an impact of violence perpetrated on participation, and we do not ob-
serve any form of violence impacting non-political forms of participation. There is no evidence of elite 
mobilization of abducted youth (or other victims of violence), and there is no education-voting associa-
tion like that we see in the U.S. While there is some evidence of leadership training influencing participa-
tion, it seems to explain only a small fraction, and explains mobilization alone. A higher incidence of in-
juries also seems to influence participation, but acts in the opposite direction of the average treatment 
effect of abduction that we observe, and so only moderates the powerful influence of violence. 
The only major theoretical account of participation that is consistent with these facts is that of ex-
pressive voting. By this account, exposure to war violence creates grievances that augment the inherent 
value individuals place upon political expression, motivating them to increase voting and community lea-
dership. As discussed above, this interpretation is shared with a growing body of political and psycho-
logical research linking violence to political activism via psychological growth and transformation.    26
The expressive explanation, however, is only a residual one. It is simply a label given to a broad cate-
gory of unexplained behavior based on an under-researched association between violence and psycho-
logical growth. More work remains to be done to measure and test expressive behaviors before we can 
be fully confident of the conclusions in this paper. In the absence of such tests, and without conclusive 
evidence against the alternative mechanisms, we must accept the expressive interpretation with caution. 
Five additional caveats are in order. First, as discussed earlier, the violence–participation relationship 
could be biased upwards by pre-existing characteristics that lead to both victimization by violence and 
later political expression—such as a defiant or independent character.  
Second, the number of political outcomes available in the survey, particularly political ones, is quite 
small. Thus we should take caution in generalizing the findings to political participation generally, as the 
determinants of different forms of political participation may be quite different.  
Third, the results in this paper arise from data on male youth alone, and so are not necessarily gener-
alizable to females or older adults, or to other contexts. Even so, the similarity between the Ugandan 
results in this paper and those from refugees and victims of war violence in Sierra Leone, Israel, and Pal-
estine (discussed above) suggest some degree of external validity outside Uganda. This external validity 
may not extend to all political variables, however. For instance, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) exam-
ine attitudes to democracy among Sierra Leonean combatants and find a inverse (albeit statistically not 
significant) relationship between the abusiveness of one’s military unit and democratic attitudes. Gener-
alization of the results awaits more data collection in more situations of violence and conflict. 
Finally, if we accept the expressive explanation, a more important question remains unanswered: that 
is, if violence leads to expressive participation, why has this participation been peaceful and productive 
rather than contentious? Any number of explanations is possible—the opportunities for free and effec-
tive political action in Uganda, or a declining tolerance for insurgency. Each is plausible but not easily 
tested with these data. The decision to work within rather than outside the system is one of the most 
important micro-political decisions to understand, and is likewise a productive area for future research.   27
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Appendix: Sensitivity analysis 
Relaxation of the assumption of conditional unconfoundedness in estimating the ATE 
One means of sensitivity analysis, suggested by Imbens (2003), explicitly models relaxations of the uncon-
foundedness assumption in the voting ATE regression. To induce selection bias an observed covariate, X, must 
be sufficiently correlated with both treatment assignment, T, and the outcome of interest, Y, to induce a degree 
of bias worthy of concern. The same argument applies to a hypothetical unobserved covariate, U. By making 
some simple assumptions about the distribution of U we can calculate all the possible combinations of correla-
tion between U and T and between U and Y that would lead the ATE estimate to be biased by a fixed amount 
and judge whether the existence and influence of such a U is plausible by benchmarking it against observed co-
variates.  
Figure 1 plots each of the observed pre-war controls (X) according to their ability to explain variation in ab-
duction (T) and our principal dependent variable of interest, voting (Y). The vertical axis indicates the influence 
of each element of X in explaining variation in the likelihood that a youth voted in 2005 (Y = 1). Specifically, the 
axis represents the marginal increase in the R2-statistic from adding the covariate in question to a regression of Y 
on all other covariates. The horizontal axis indicates the influence of each element of X in explaining additional 
variation in abduction. Only the year and location of birth indicators (the •’s in Figure 1) display substantial influ-
ence over both abduction and the potential outcome, voting. Meanwhile the pre-war household covariates (the 
+’s in Figure 1) explain little variation in either Y or T (a fact which accounts for the unresponsiveness of the 
ATE to their exclusion in Table 5). 
The downward sloping curve in Figure 1 represents all the combinations of correlation between U and T and 
between U and Y that would be sufficient to reduce the estimated voting abduction ATE by half of the coeffi-
cient estimate (in Table 4). The U in question is modeled as a binomial variable independent of all other covari-
ates that is assumed to have a logistic conditional distribution with both Y and T. The curve is therefore a thre-
shold, beyond which the hypothetical U is influential enough to reduce the treatment effect by such a significant 
amount. It is also a threshold, we should observe, that (despite the dramatic hypothetical endogeneity) leaves the 
sign of the ATE intact.    32
The traits that normally influence military recruitment such as household wealth (point 13) or orphaning 
(point 7) lie far beneath the threshold. Only year and location of birth—variables that represent the primary cri-
terion for selection by the armed group as well as variation in rebel abduction activity over time—crosses this 
hypothetical threshold. Even all of the pre-war covariates combined (point 14) do not near the threshold.  
Thus an unobserved source of selection would have to be more influential than all observed household co-
variates, and nearly as influential as some of the primary determinants of abduction (location and age), and even 
then the sign and magnitude of the average treatment effect would still be positive. Similar results apply for more and less ex-
treme selection thresholds. Overall, this sensitivity analysis thus suggests that moderate amounts of unobserved 
selection are unlikely to account for the ATE of abduction on political participation.  
Bounding the ATE for selective attrition 
A second method of sensitivity analysis can be used to assess the potential bias from selective attrition. In a 
method proposed by Lee (2005), “best-case” and “worst-case” scenarios for differential attrition are constructed 
by trimming the distribution of the outcome in the group with less attrition, which in this case the non-abducted 
(see Table 10). The worst case scenario bound is calculated by dropping those with the highest values of the out-
come and calculating the ‘trimmed’ ATE. The best-case bound is likewise calculated by dropping the worst-
performing non-abducted youth. Lee’s method compares the untrimmed ATE (Column 3) to the trimmed 
means—the best and worst case scenarios (Columns 4 and 5). The ATEs under the “best-case” scenario are lar-
ger than (and at least as robust as) the untrimmed ATEs. The ATE’s under the “worst-case” scenario are gener-
ally closer to zero and less than robust than the untrimmed ATEs. However, not one of these lower bounds 
changes sign, implying even under austere assumptions, abduction has the predicted effect on outcomes.   33
Figure 1: Impact of relaxing the assumption of unconfoundedness 
Selection bias that would be induced by the omission of an observed covariates relative to the threshold where a inde-
pendent binomial covariate would induce selection bias sufficient to reduce the ATE by half 
 
Notes: The figure presents the results of the sensitivity analysis following Imbens (2003). Each + and • repre-
sents a pre-treatment covariate (listed below), plotted according to its additional explanatory power for treat-
ment assignment (on the horizontal axis) and its explanatory power for the outcome (vertical axis), which in 
this case is the voting indicator. Each axis measures the change in the R2 statistic from adding the covariate to 
the ATE regression. The downward sloping curve represents the locus of points at which any independent bi-
nomial unobserved covariate would have sufficient association with both treatment and the outcome to reduce 
the ATE on voting by half. 
 
Influence of observed covariates (numbers refer to + and • in Figure 1): 
1.  Mother's Education 
2.  Father's Education 
3.  Mother's & Father's Education 
4.  Father died before 1996 
5.  Mother died before 1996 
6.  Both parents died before 1996 
7.  One or both parents died before 1996 
8.  Household size in 1996 
9.  Household landholdings in 1996   
10.  Household cattle stock in 1996 
11.  Household other livestock in 1996 
12.  Household plow ownership in 1996 
13.  All household assets in 1996 
14.  All household characteristics 
15.  Respondent year of birth 
16.  Respondent location of birth 
17.  Respondent year and location of birth 
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Table 1: Summary statistics on war experiences




















Note: Sample means weighted by inverse sampling and inverse attrition probabilities
Variable
Sample Mean [Std Dev]
Min
Indicator for ever having 
been abducted by the LRA 











1 741 Ever abducted
Description





Total number of all 26 
possible violent events 
reported (data incomplete for 
three youth)
Reported number of the 13 
violent events inflicted by 
others upon youth
Violent acts upon 
family (of 5)
Months abducted
Reported number of the 8 
violent events committed by 











Indicator for ever having 
received a rank or leading 
other youth while with the 
LRA
Indicator for having been 
given and allowed to keep (to 
'slep with') a firearm by LRA
n.a.
n.a.
Reported number of the 5 
violent events inflicted by 
others upon the youth's 
family
Total length of the 
respondent's abductions, in 
months.
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Table 2: Summary statistics on social and political participation
















































01 7 4 1
1
1
Indicator for voting in 2005 
referendum (238 youth under age 18 
classified as "missing")
Indicator for currently being a member 




Indicator for disobeying parents, 
teachers or elders "sometimes" or 
"often"
Indicator for currently being a member 
of a sports team or group
0
Indicator for currently being a 
volunteer for a non-governmental 
organization





Indicator for being a member in any 
one of the above seven community 
groups
Indicator for currently being a 
"community mobilizer"
Water committee or 
group member
Any community group 
member
0





Indicator for reporting a political 





Indicator for currently being a member 




Sample Mean [Std Dev]
Min
Self-reported age in years 14 30 741
Farmer's cooperative 
member
Indicator for currently being a member 




Indicator for currently being a member 
of a drama, music, or dance 
performance group
01
Church or bible group 
member
Indicator for being a member of a 
church or bible study group
01
School club or 
committee member
Indicator for currently a school prefect 
or member of a school committee/club
01
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Table 3: Determinants of LRA abduction and recruitment into government militias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abd Non-Abd Unconditional Conditional Abd Non-Abd Unconditional Conditional
Year of birth
†  21.54 20.47 1.08 1.44 22.94 19.54 3.39 2.67
[0.44] [0.29] [0.44]** [0.61]** 0.72 0.41 [0.83]*** [0.69]***
Indicator for father a farmer
† 0.90 0.90 0.01 -0.03 0.96 0.89 0.07 0.07
[0.01] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03] 0.03 0.03 [0.04]* [0.04]*
Household size in 1996
† 8.48 8.81 -0.33 -1.15 9.42 8.37 1.05 1.25
[0.33] [0.55] [0.41] [0.33]*** 0.83 0.61 0.98 [0.68]*
Landholdings in 1996
† 26.78 26.36 0.42 1.00 15.28 22.35 -7.07 -4.55
[1.48] [2.44] [2.10] [2.41] 3.02 1.55 [3.02]** [2.94]
Top 10% of Landholdings
† 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.08 -0.07
[0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] 0.02 0.02 [0.03]*** [0.03]**
Cattle in 1996
† 17.73 12.66 5.07 5.95 3.29 14.03 -10.73 -6.45
[7.68] [4.89] [4.12] [7.44] 1.96 7.16 7.13 [2.41]**
Other livestock in 1996
† 14.18 13.23 0.94 1.17 6.23 11.42 -5.20 -4.22
[2.11] [3.09] [2.72] [0.98] 1.83 2.52 [2.45]** [2.26]*
Owned plow in 1996
† 0.23 0.19 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.19 -0.11 -0.13
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] 0.04 0.04 [0.06]* [0.06]**
Uneducated father 0.12 0.13 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.13 -0.05 -0.11
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] 0.04 0.01 0.04 [0.03]***
Father's years of schooling 6.11 5.73 0.38 0.22 6.03 5.89 0.15 0.33
[0.19] [0.27] [0.34] [0.25] 0.48 0.18 0.50 [0.47]
Uneducated mother 0.53 0.55 -0.01 -0.02 0.66 0.53 0.13 0.12
[0.04] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] 0.11 0.02 0.10 [0.10]
Mother's years of schooling 2.32 2.42 -0.09 -0.10 1.95 2.40 -0.45 -0.32
[0.23] [0.16] [0.28] [0.28] 0.66 0.13 0.64 [0.66]
Paternal death before 1996 0.34 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.42 0.33 0.09 0.10
[0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.04] 0.09 0.02 0.10 [0.09]
Maternal death before 1996 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.13 -0.07 -0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] 0.05 0.01 0.05 [0.04]
Orphaned before 1996 0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.01
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 0.02 0.02 [0.03]* [0.03]
Notes:
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by location
All estimates weighted by inverse sampling probabilities and inverse attrition probabilities
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† Mean differences include data from unfound and non-surviving youth, and omit inverse attrition weights.
Militia versus non-militia members
Unconditional mean Difference in means
‡
‡ The unconditional difference is a simple difference in means, while the conditional difference is the coefficient on abduction from a weighted least squares 
regression of the covariate on abduction and all other pre-war covariates (weighted by inverse sampling and attrition probabilities).
Pre-treatment Covariate Unconditional mean Difference in means
‡
Abducted versus non-abducted youth
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Voted in 2005 0.39 0.085 22%
[0.028]***
Political employment 0.001 0.012 833%
[0.007]*
Community mobilizer 0.02 0.033 145%
[0.011]***
Any community group member 0.41 -0.007 -2%
[0.040]
Peace group member 0.05 0.038 73%
[0.016]**
Water committee/group member 0.02 -0.012 -70%
[0.007]
Cultural group member 0.16 -0.028 -17%
[0.030]
Sporting group/team member 0.13 -0.029 -21%
[0.022]
Farmer's cooperative member 0.09 0.007 8%
[0.017]
School club/committee member 0.04 0.019 43%
[0.016]
Church or bible study group member 0.18 0.017 10%
[0.029]
Attends church 0.81 0.01 1%
[0.029]
NGO volunteer 0.03 0.006 18%
[0.013]
Disobeys elders 0.07 0.036 54%
[0.024]
Notes:
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by primary sampling unit (location and abduction status)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† The ATE is calculated as the coefficient on an abduction dummy variable in a weighted probit regression of 
the dependent variable on the abduction dummy, age (including the square and cube), location dummy 
variables, and pre-war household traits. The regression is weighted on inverse selection, sampling, and attrition 
probabilities
Each item in Column 2 is the product of a separate regression
All variables defined and described in Table 2  38
Table 5: Robustness of abduction impacts to alternative regression models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Difference of 
means
Voted in 2005 0.085 0.106 0.113 0.108 0.102 0.096 0.075 0.115
[0.028]*** [0.035]*** [0.064]* [0.031]*** [0.027]*** [0.033]*** [0.044]* [0.055]**
Community mobilizer 0.033 0.033 0.038 0.037 0.034 0.032 0.045 0.042
[0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.021]** [0.017]**
Any community group member -0.007 0.025 0.022 0.019 -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 0.009
[0.040] [0.037] [0.057] [0.036] [0.037] [0.039] [0.051] [0.051]
Peace group member 0.038 0.036 0.03 0.04 0.045 0.038 0.037 0.029
[0.016]** [0.017]** [0.027] [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.018]** [0.023] [0.022]
Cultural group member -0.028 0.015 -0.007 0.006 0.008 0.016 -0.004 0.006
[0.030] [0.035] [0.038] [0.032] [0.041] [0.044] [0.041] [0.044]
Weights
   Selection corrction ×××
   Attition correction ××××
Controls included:
   Year of birth dummies ×× ××××
   Location of birth dummies ×× ×××
   Household traits in 1996 ×× ×
Alternative controls & weights
All variables defined and described in Table 2
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by sampling unit (location and abduction status)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%





Alternative controls Alternative weights
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p-value of higher 
order regression
Indicator for father a farmer 1.13 0.055*
[0.511]**
Household size in 1996 0.02 0.111
[0.046]
Landholdings in 1996 0.00 0.232
[0.005]
Cattle in 1996 0.01 0.280
[0.004]
Other livestock in 1996 0.00 0.381
[0.006]
Owned plow in 1996 -1.18 .010***
[0.544]**
Father's years of schooling -0.07 0.378
[0.045]
Mother's years of schooling 0.03 0.020**
[0.060]
Paternal death before 1996 0.21 0.828
[0.463]
Maternal death before 1996 -0.04 0.508
[0.500]
Year of birth dummies not displayed 0.004***
Location of birth dummies not displayed 0.989
Observations 738 738
R-squared 0.08 0.19
Joint test of significance (p-value)
   All 1996 household traits 0.3857 0.000***
   All variables 0.019** 0.195
Notes:
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by location
All estimates weighted by inverse sampling probabilities and inverse attrition probabilities
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Violent acts experienced  40
Table 7: Impact of war experiences on social and political participation (former abductees only)



































Violent acts received 0.029 0.012 0.020 0.001 -0.016 0.013 -0.015 0.024 0.011 0.015 -0.021 0.002 0.008
[0.012]** [0.004]** [0.012] [0.008] [0.018] [0.008] [0.006]** [0.006]*** [0.006]* [0.008]* [0.012]* [0.005] [0.005]
Violent acts perpetrated -0.005 -0.011 0.004 0.019 0.015 0.001 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.030 -0.013 0.010
[0.019] [0.007] [0.017] [0.009]** [0.020] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.012] [0.012]** [0.007]* [0.008]
Violent acts upon family 0.017 0.020 0.028 0.003 -0.089 0.021 0.014 -0.019 0.007 0.007 0.021 0.013 0.005
[0.022] [0.004]*** [0.035] [0.011] [0.078] [0.014] [0.011] [0.012] [0.009] [0.019] [0.018] [0.007]* [0.009]
ln(Months abducted) -0.039 -0.008 -0.050 -0.019 0.008 -0.044 0.007 -0.025 -0.018 -0.017 0.032 0.008 -0.018
[0.025] [0.007] [0.017]*** [0.010]* [0.009] [0.011]*** [0.009] [0.010]** [0.007]** [0.016] [0.012]** [0.011] [0.010]*
Age abducted 0.016 -0.006 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004
[0.008]* [0.004] [0.011] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005] [0.011] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
Carried own firearm 0.066 -0.002 0.139 0.083 -0.007 0.143 0.016 0.022 -0.006 -0.005 -0.091 -0.002 0.110
[0.065] [0.028] [0.068]* [0.048]* [0.035] [0.039]*** [0.023] [0.051] [0.039] [0.066] [0.059] [0.040] [0.052]**
Leadership position -0.203 0.008 -0.133 -0.036 n.a. 0.040 -0.069 -0.036 n.a.  -0.113 -0.180 -0.012 -0.070
[0.106]* [0.048] [0.064]* [0.025] [0.071] [0.015]*** [0.063] [0.045]** [0.091]* [0.047] [0.027]**
Observations 344 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459
Controls not displayed:
   Age (three orders) ×××××××××××××
   Location of birth dummies ×××××××××××××
   Household traits in 1996 ×××××××××××××
Each column represents a separate regression
All variables defined and described in Tables 1 and 2
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by location
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  41
Table 8: Impact of war violence on participation (all youth)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever abducted 0.085 0.040 0.033 0.010 -0.007 -0.028
[0.028]*** [0.053] [0.011]*** [0.015] [0.040] [0.069]
Violent acts received 0.018 0.007 0.014
[0.013] [0.002]*** [0.010]
Abduction × Violent acts
Months abducted -0.004 0.000 -0.005
[0.001]*** [0.001] [0.002]**
Observations 533 532 741 739 741 739
Joint significance of violence and 
abduction terms (p-value)
0.003*** 0.001*** 0.215 0.215
Controls included:
   Age (three orders) ×× ×× ××
   Location of birth dummies ×× ×× ××
   Household traits in 1996 ×× ×× ××
Community mobilizer Any group member
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Voted in 2005
All variables defined and described in Tables 1 and 2
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by location
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Table 9: Relative explanatory power of the correlates of participation











Violent acts received 4.346 0.015 77% 0.011 145% 0.002 -22%
[0.219]*** [0.007]** [0.003]*** [0.007]
Violent acts perpetrated 1.072 -0.006 -8% -0.015 -49% 0.003 3%
[0.117]*** [0.020] [0.007]** [0.012]
Violent acts upon family 0.271 -0.004 -1% 0.026 21% 0.016 3%
[0.085]*** [0.017] [0.007]*** [0.021]
Currently lives in town 0.013 0.018 0% -0.037 -1% -0.158 6%
[0.039] [0.054] [0.027] [0.044]***
Currently lives outside home district 0.003 -0.144 -1% -0.015 0% -0.188 -14%
[0.027] [0.079]* [0.033] [0.082]**
Serious injury 0.085 -0.06 -6% -0.074 -19% -0.05 -43%
[0.022]*** [0.047] [0.021]*** [0.042]
Top quartile of emotional distress 0.104 -0.02 -2% 0.017 5% -0.054 -19%
[0.033]*** [0.068] [0.022] [0.039]
Asset index -0.084 0.015 -1% 0.022 -6% 0.006 1%
[0.017]*** [0.140] [0.058] [0.099]
Days employed in past four weeks 0.104 0.001 0% 0.001 0% 0.009 0%
[0.572] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002]***
Gross cash earnings in past 4 weeks (USD) -2.733 -0.001 3% 0 0% -0.001 0%
[2.010] [0.001]* [0.001] [0.001]*
Community group membership 0.008 0.021 0% 0.069 2%
[0.039] [0.036] [0.024]***
Volunteers for an NGO 0.002 0.271 1% 0.001 0% 0%
[0.012] [0.070]*** [0.036]
Attends church 0.009 0.141 1% 0.01 0% 0%
[0.025] [0.046]*** [0.022]
Bottom quartile of pro-social behavior 0.082 0.014 1% 0.037 9% 0.226 -44%
[0.034]** [0.066] [0.033] [0.066]***
Index of social support -0.225 -0.004 1% 0.001 -1% 0.02 -3%
[0.176] [0.008] [0.004] [0.011]*
Indicator for poor family relations 0.026 -0.03 -1% 0.091 7% 0.028 4%
[0.021] [0.114] [0.044]** [0.105]
Indicator for functional literacy -0.163 0 0% 0.003 -1% 0.05 0%
[0.033]*** [0.053] [0.028] [0.054]
Radio ownership -0.057 -0.027 2% -0.011 2% 0.056 -14%
[0.028]* [0.050] [0.026] [0.059]
Educational attainment in years -0.765 -0.002 2% -0.005 12% 0.014 -4%
[0.140]*** [0.007] [0.003] [0.009]
Observations 531 738 738
Additional controls (not displayed)
   Year of birth dummies ×× × ×
   Location of birth dummies ×× × ×
  Year and location of birth interactions ×× × ×
   Household traits in 1996 ×× × ×
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by sampling unit (location and abduction status)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Any group member
† Each item in Column 1 is a separate regression. Each ATE is calculated as the coefficient on an abduction indicator variable in an 





Voted in 2005 referendum Community mobilizer
Figures in bold represent correlates that exhibit a statistically significant ATE (at the 5 percent level) in Column 1 and a statistically 
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Voted in 2005 33% 35% 0.098 0.122 0.084
[0.047]** [0.058]** [0.055]
Community mobilizer 28% 30% 0.042 0.067 0.042
[0.017]** [0.044] [0.0167]**
NGO volunteer 28% 30% 0.011 0.038 0.010
[0.016] [0.043] [0.017]
Attends church 28% 30% -0.018 -0.013 -0.037
[0.030] [0.031] [0.046]
Community group member 28% 30% 0.009 0.024 -0.002
[0.038] [0.045] [0.043]
Community group memberships 28% 30% 0.007 0.086 -0.011
[0.078] [0.121] [0.085]
School club member 28% 30% 0.014 0.038 0.013
[0.018] [0.044] [0.018]
Water committee member 28% 30% -0.014 0.010 -0.015
[0.010] [0.005]** [0.011]
Disobeys elders 28% 30% 0.019 0.045 0.018
[0.019] [0.044] [0.020]







Each row represents the results of the trimming procedure suggested by Lee (2005) to account for selective attrition and survival
Treatment is binary and equals 1 if ever abducted and 0 otherwise
§ Best and worst-case bounds are calculated as the difference in the means of the abducted and non-abducted groups after 'trimming' the 
top or the bottom of the distribution of the outcome variable in the treatment group with less attrition. They are not 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† Missing youth include attritors and non-survivors. 31% of non-abducted youth and 30% of abducted youth are missing. Data collected 
from families on the education, employment status, and major injuries of migrant youth reduce these mising percentages to 14% and 
23%. In the case of wages, additional observations are missing due to unemployed youth.
‡ The untrimmed ATE is the difference in the means of the abducted and non-abducted groups, and is not a regression estimate. No 
control variables are used. The means are analagous to the WLS estimates in Column 4 of Table 4.
Standard errors in brackets, but are  not clustered or heteroskedastic-robust
All estimates are weighted by inverse sampling probabilities and inverse propensity scores
 